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ABSTRACT 
In June of 2008, Lieutenant Commander Shane Tallant, 
Lieutenant Commander Scott Hedrick and Lieutenant Commander 
Michael Martin conducted thesis research titled “Analysis of 
Contractor Logistic Support for the P-8 Poseidon Aircraft.”  
Their manpower analysis showed a large percentage of costs 
related specifically to type-duty assignments.  The 
objective of this thesis is to use a Knowledge Value Added 
analysis of the manpower structure of an existing 
operational aviation community in order to determine the 
most beneficial manpower structure for the maintenance 
personnel in that community.  The methodology used during 
this research is applicable to any aviation community. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. GENERAL 
For over two hundred years, the United States Navy has 
deployed around the world in order to defend American 
interests abroad.  The arduous nature of this sea duty has a 
negative effect on morale, motivation, safety, and 
performance.  In an effort to improve the quality of life 
for the all-volunteer force, the Navy has developed and 
employed a type-duty assignment system that cycles sailors 
between sea duty and meaningful work ashore.  
Balancing the needs of the Navy and those of the sailor 
is a daunting task, and several programs have been 
introduced in an attempt to get the right mix.  Most 
recently, the Navy has employed the Sea Shore Flow program 
(SSF).  The program is unique in that it tailors a 30-year 
career path for each individual enlisted rating.  This 
benefits the sailor by providing a predictable career path, 
improved geographic stability and incentives for more time 
at sea.  It also ensures that commands are manned at the 
right experience level.  In the end, the goal of the SSF is 
to provide the best balance of sea and shore duty throughout 
a sailor's career (Navy Personnel Command, 2008).  
The unfortunate consequence of any sea/shore program is 
that additional billets must be created in order to 
accommodate the shore rotation, resulting in higher 
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community manpower requirements (160% for sailors on a 5/3 
sea/shore rotation and 250% for those on a 2/3 rotation).1   
As the US Navy attempts to reorganize its manpower 
structure to comply with fiscal constraints, it is important 
to recognize that cost is not the only metric that can be 
used to determine value.  As the global economy sails 
through the information age, trends are moving toward 
defining value more in terms of intellectual capital.  One 
view is that: 
Knowledge has become the preeminent economic 
resource - more important than raw material; more 
important, often, than money. Considered as an 
economic output, information and knowledge are 
more important than automobiles, oil, steel, or 
any of the products of the Industrial Age. 
(Stewart, 1998, 1) 
The stock market provides numerous examples of how this 
concept is in use today. 
Microsoft has an estimated book value of 
approximately $13-16 billion, yet it has a market 
capitalization of $300-400 billion.  This glaring 
differential represents the earning potential and 
the value of Microsoft's use of the knowledge 
embedded in its processes, technology, and 
people.  However, when we look at a classic 
industrial-era company like Bethlehem Steel Co. 
(BS) we find a book value of $1.2 billion while 
it had a market value of $1.7 billion as of April 
22, 1998.  These values are very similar because 
the accounting and market valuations closely 
correlate to the physical, tangible asset values. 
(Housel & Bell, 2001, p. 40) 
                     
1 Calculated using the ratio of total number of sailors to those on 
sea duty. 
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This example illustrates a convincing argument that the 
knowledge contained within an organization is a critical 
component of the value of that organization.  Knowledge, 
therefore, is a principal metric for estimating value.  If 
knowledge can be measured, it can be managed — providing 
decision-makers with insight and control over the real value 
of any enterprise organization.   
B. BACKGROUND 
A good case study within the military is the 
development of the P-8A Poseidon (Multi-mission Maritime 
Aircraft).  In the mid-1980s, the United States Navy began 
looking for a replacement for the aging P-3 fleet that had 
been in service since 1961.  In 1989, the Navy looked to 
build the P-7, a turbo-prop aircraft manufactured by 
Lockheed.  The program quickly fell behind schedule and was 
plagued with cost overruns, so the Navy canceled the 
contract and opened a new competition for the P-3 
replacement (“P-8 Poseidon,” 2009).  On June 14, 2004, the 
Navy awarded a $3.89 billion contract to a Boeing-led team 
for the acquisition of 108 multi-mission maritime aircraft 
(US Naval Air Systems Command, 2009).  The new jet-powered 
aircraft is scheduled to begin replacing the aging P-3 fleet 
by the year 2013 (Boeing Defense, 2004). 
1.  P-8 Poseidon 
a. Airframe 
The P-8A is being built on a modified Boeing 737-
800 airframe that will utilize two high-bypass turbo fan jet 
engines and an open architecture mission system, allowing 
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for improved flexibility and reduced long-term costs with 
the adaptation of next-generation sensors.  Some specific 
characteristics of the aircraft are (US Naval Air Systems 
Command, 2009): 
Length:  129.5 feet  
Wingspan: 124.5 feet  
Height:  42.1 feet 
Weight:  Maximum Take Off Gross Weight: 188,200 pounds  
Speed:  490 knots (564 mph) 
Range:  1,200+ nautical miles with four hours on station 
Ceiling:  41,000 ft  
Crew:  Nine 
The airframe will have the ability to employ a diverse range 
of missiles, bombs, torpedoes, and mines, using an internal 
bay, four wing pylons and two centerline hard points. 
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Figure 1.   P8 Poseidon Planned Layout 
(From US Naval Air Systems Command, 2009) 
b. Missions 
The P-8A Poseidon was designed to be a truly 
multi-mission aircraft.  Its dynamic mission set includes: 
• Long-range anti-submarine warfare 
• Anti-surface warfare 
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The mission system will be network ready — providing Link-
16, Internet Protocol, Common Data Link (CDL), and FORCEnet 
capabilities (US Naval Air Systems Command, 2009). 
c. Estimated Costs 
Initial estimates for the airframe, engines, 
armaments, electronics packages and ancillary equipment 
place the per-unit cost at $159.9 million.  If the Navy 
purchases all 108 units, the total flyaway cost is $17.27 
billion.  These estimates are based on 2004 dollars and are 
not corrected for inflation (US Naval Air Systems Command, 
2009). 
d. Manning/Manpower 
One of the more daunting tasks for a new project 
is to establish the proper manpower structure to support 
intended operations.  The program office at Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) is currently studying various 
manpower structures in an attempt to find the best value for 
the P-8A program.  They identified three possible 
configurations and sponsored research at the Naval Post 
Graduate School (NPS) to assist in the determination of best 
value.  
2. Previous Thesis Work 
In June of 2008, Lieutenant Commander Shane Tallant, 
Lieutenant Commander Scott Hedrick and Lieutenant Commander 
Michael Martin conducted thesis research titled “Analysis of 
Contractor Logistic Support for the P-8 Poseidon Aircraft.”   
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a.  Purpose and Methodology 
 The primary purpose of their research was to 
"assesses the costs as an independent variable (CAIV) of the 
maintenance manpower of both the original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) contractor logistics support (CLS)" 
(Tallant, Hedrick, & Martin, 2008, p. V).  They accomplished 
this task by applying seven different costing tools to three 
independent models of Consolidated Maintenance Organization 
(CMO): purely organic; organic/CLS blend; and purely CLS 
option. 
b.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 In the end, the NPS research team concluded that 
an Organic-CLS blend is the cheapest option for the Navy.  
They also concluded that this option is the most 
advantageous from an operational perspective (pp. 89-90). 
c.  Further Research 
 One area of recommended future research identified 
by the NPS team stemmed from their manpower analysis.  They 
propose that:  
A large percentage of cost related specifically 
to the need for a system of shore rotation.  A 
study should be conducted to analyze if all 789 
to 845 enlisted personnel need to be classified 
as “on sea duty."  If a structure could be 
devised that offered an equitable distribution of 
work between sea and shore staffing, considerable 
cost savings could be realized. (p. 91) 
 Type-duty assignment terms such as "sea-duty" and 
"shore-duty" are defined in the MILPERSMAN as follows: 
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Shore duty (Type Duty Code 1):  
Duty performed in United States (U.S.) (including 
Hawaii and Anchorage, Alaska) land-based 
activities where members are not required to be 
absent from the corporate limits of their duty 
station in excess of 150 days per year. 
Sea duty (Type Duty Code 2): 
Type 2a:  Duty performed in commissioned vessels 
and deployable squadrons home ported in the U.S. 
(including Hawaii and Alaska). 
Type 2b:  U.S. land-based activities and embarked 
staffs, which require members to operate away from 
their duty station in excess of 150 days per year. 
 
 For land-based naval aviation, the applicable 
type-duty assignments are type-duty code 1 and 2b.  Type-
duty assignments are used by the manning distribution system 
as a tool to improve the quality of life for the all-
volunteer force, not as a basis for funding.  Funding is 
based on manpower requirements derived from the application 
of the "Navy standard workweek" to the "total weekly work 
hours required.”2  For land-based naval aviation squadrons, 
the standard workweek has two categories: deployable and 
non-deployable.  Therefore, the refined proposal asks the 
question: Can a cost savings be realized with an equitable 
billet distribution between deployable and non-deployable 
Navy standard workweeks? 
                     
2 A more detailed discussion is presented in Chapter II of this 
thesis.   
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3. Current Research 
This thesis will address the question using two 
different approaches.  First, application of Navy doctrine 
will be used to determine the feasibility of the proposal.  
Then, a cutting-edge approach rooted in thermodynamics 
theory, called Knowledge Value Added (KVA), will be used to 
assign a value to different manpower structures based on 
deployable and non-deployable Navy standard workweeks.  
Comparison of the resulting derived values will provide some 
insight into the proposed question. 
 10




The Navy employs a standardized approach when 
determining manpower requirements for naval activities.  The 
process of determining actual community manpower 
requirements is a laborious task that takes teams of experts 
and vast amounts of time and research to complete.  For the 
purpose of this thesis, a general overview of the process 
will be used.  The methodology is based on the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1000.16K, 
the governing document that provides policies and procedures 
required to develop, review, approve, implement and update 
manpower requirements and authorizations for all naval 
activities (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2007).   
B.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for determining manpower requirements 
begins with the establishment of the Required Operational 
Capabilities (ROC) and Projected Operational Environment 
(POE).  The ROC is prepared by mission and warfare sponsors 
and it details: 
The capabilities required of ships & squadrons in 
various operational situations.  The level of 
detail sets forth which weapons will be ready at 
varying degrees of readiness (e.g., perform anti-
air warfare with full capability condition of 
readiness I (24hrs, General Quarters); partial 
capability in readiness condition III, (60 days, 
8 hrs watch/day). (NPS Faculty, 2009) 
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The POE identifies: 
The environment in which the ship or squadron is 
expected to operate, including the military 
climate (e.g., at sea, Wartime, capable of 60 
days continuous operations at readiness 
Conditions I & III). (NPS Faculty, 2009) 
Together, the ROC and POE identify a community’s 
mission requirements and describe the specific operating 
environment in which the unit is expected to operate.  It is 
based on anticipated wartime tasking and projects the nature 
of deployment of the warfighting platform.   
The Navy Total Force Manpower Requirements Handbook, 
referred to in 1000.16k, contains Navy staffing standards, 
which determine the total weekly work hours required to 
accomplish an activity’s mission. By applying the 
appropriate Navy standard workweek, consistent with the ROC 
and POE, to the total weekly work hours, the unit can meet  
these manpower requirements.  The “efficient use of 
resources” concept is then applied to ensure the unit’s 
manpower reflects the minimum quantity and quality necessary 
to effectively and efficiently accomplish the activity’s 
mission (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2007, p. 
2-2).  Manpower requirements become authorized positions 
when supported by resources (i.e., funded).  This in turn 
sends a demand signal to the distribution system for manning 
assignment to a unit (p. 1-2).  Actual manning assignments 
are distributed across the entire force based on a fair 
share of current manning levels. 
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C. VALUE 
Within the doctrinal approach, cost to the government 
is applied in the authorization of manpower requirements.  
Once requirements are funded, total lifecycle costs for an 
activity or community can be estimated.  As part of previous 
research, the Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) 
approach was used to determine the lifecycle value of 
maintenance manpower requirements for a Naval Aviation 
community.  The authors of this thesis propose that the CAIV 
approach is consistent with manpower valuation from the 
naval enterprise standpoint, but is not a comprehensive 
approach to valuation of manpower. 
 14
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III. KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED (KVA) APPROACH 
A.  GENERAL 
 Cost is one of many metrics that can be used to 
determine manpower value.  However, as the global economy 
proceeds through the information age, the trend is to define 
value in terms of intellectual capital.  Knowledge, 
therefore, is a principal metric for estimating manpower 
value. 
 Unfortunately, "there is no generally accepted single 
definition of knowledge.  And there is no wide-spread 
agreement on the overall parameters of knowledge" (Housel & 
Bell, 2001, p. 12).  One attempt at solving this dilemma is 
the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) approach.  KVA is an 
analytical method, founded in thermodynamics complexity 
theory, which utilizes an algorithm to provide a performance 
ratio estimate.  It views an organization as a portfolio of 
knowledge assets, assesses value of intellectual capital, 
defines a common unit of output and provides performance 
ratios for all core processes.  These performance ratios are 
the principal outputs of the KVA process and are identified 
as Return on Knowledge (ROK). 
An early use of this approach was to capture value 
added to systems that implement Information Technology (IT).  
The KVA process provides actionable information to decision-
makers by capturing the difference in ROK between the "as-
is" and "to-be" models.  This difference in ROK represents 
the relative value (or benefit) of introducing the IT into a  
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system.  If the relative benefits justify the costs, then 
the decision maker should implement the IT; if not, he/she 
should keep the as-is model. 
At the core of the KVA approach is the portfolio of 
knowledge assets, defined as sub-processes.  These sub-
processes need not be IT driven, which allows for great 
versatility in KVA application. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Given the flexibility intrinsic to the KVA approach, 
the methodology can take several different forms.  The model 
proposed in this thesis was presented in a class taught by 
Mr. Glen Cook, lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, CA, from June-August, 2008.3  The authors of this 
thesis claim no credit in the KVA process or definitions, 
only in its application. 
1. Getting Started 
The first step is to map the organizational processes 
into sub-processes.  This mandates a thorough understanding 
of the business processes within the organization and may 
necessitate comprehensive doctrine review and personal 
interviews to gain the necessary granularity.  The second 
step is to choose the most realistic unit of time that can 
be used as a standard for data collection across all sub-
processes. 
                     
3 Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey Calif., IS 4220: Business 
Process Engineering with E-Business Technologies. Glenn Cook. June – 
August 2008. 
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2. Learning Audits 
There are three types of learning audits that can be 
performed.  Data collection for all three types of audits is 
not necessary; however, at least two audits must be 
performed for verification and credibility.  An 80% or 
better correlation between the audits indicates that the 
data is valid.  Once the data is considered valid, one 
learning audit is chosen for use in the KVA calculation. 
a. Actual Learning Time (ALT) 
ALT is an estimate of the actual time it takes to 
learn how to do a sub-process.  It includes all formal 
classroom training, on-the-job training and hands-on 
apprenticeship work. Of particular note, ALT only documents 
the actual time spent learning (not the elapsed time).  ALT 
is based on three principal assumptions: 
• Learning time is the average time across all 
qualified people 
• Learning time is a measure of complexity 
• Greater complexity means longer learning time 
Once validity requirements are met, a common practice 
in KVA analysis is to select ALT as the learning audit for 
future calculations. 
b. Nominal Learning Time (NLT) 
NLT is an allocation process that explains the 
knowledge allocation of a particular sub-process as a 
percentage of the whole process.  
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c. Ordinal Learning Time (OLT) 
OLT is a numerical ranking of all sub-processes 
from the easiest to the hardest to learn (in terms of 
complexity). 
3. Number of People 
One critical element of the KVA methodology is to 
accurately account for the number of people involved in the 
completion of a sub-process.  The following rules apply: 
• Every sub-process can have more than one but must 
have at least one person. 
• An individual can be represented in more than one 
sub-process. 
• All people for a sub-process are assumed to be 
doing comparable work. 
o If the work is not comparable, then identify 
it as an additional sub-process. 
4. Times Fired (K-fire) 
This is a measure of the number of times a process 
executes or knowledge is used to perform a step in a 
process.  It is a cumulative value for all actors involved 
in performing a sub-process over a given timeframe. 
5. Percentage IT (%IT) 
The percent IT identifies how much of a sub-process is 
accomplished by IT.  In many instances, this is an 
approximation. 
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6. Total Learning Time (TLT) 
TLT corrects the chosen learning time to account for 
the percentage of the sub-process that is completed using 
IT.  When IT has only a small influence in the sub-process, 
it is considered a minor additive and the TLT correction 
becomes: 
( *% )TLT ALT ALT IT= +  
When IT takes a significant role in the sub-process it 





= −  
7. Total Output 
Total output is defined as the total amount of 
knowledge needed.  It is a product of the TLT and times 
fired. 
8. Actual Work Time (AWT) 
Actual work time is the actual (average) time spent 
accomplishing a sub-process. 
9. Total Input 
Total input is a calculation based on the costs 
incurred while accomplishing the sub-process.  This can be 
measured in units of time or money as appropriate.  In 
instances where money is the appropriate metric, total input 
is a product of the AWT, number of people, times fired and  
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cost per unit time.  In instances where time is the 
appropriate metric, total input is a product of AWT and 
number of people. 
C. VALUE 
1. Return on Knowledge (ROK) 
The principal metric for value in the KVA methodology 
is ROK.  It is the ratio of the total output divided by the 
total input.  The absolute value of ROK is generally 
irrelevant.  Its usefulness is in comparison to the ROK of 
other sub-processes. 
2. Percent Utilization (%U) 
Another useful metric that is commonly used in a KVA 
analysis is the percent utilization.  It is calculated by 
dividing the AWT by the number of hours available for work. 
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IV. KVA APPLICATION 
A. GENERAL 
One practical use of the KVA approach is in naval 
manpower management decisions.  As U.S. military forces 
become more technically advanced, the intellectual capital 
required to operate and maintain these assets becomes more 
valuable.  The KVA methodology provides a vehicle for 
capturing this value and provides insight beyond that of the 
CAIV approach.  It is an outstanding tool for gaining 
clarity on manpower decisions.  Specifically, the KVA 
methodology can be used to identify ROK (relative value) for 
different classifications of deployability of an operational 
aviation community.  This provides manpower managers 
additional insight into the value of different manpower 
structures, enhancing any cost-benefit analysis. 
B. COMMUNITY SELECTION 
The KVA methodology can apply to the maintenance 
manpower structure of any aviation community.  A community 
that is in its infancy, such as the P-8, would be an 
excellent choice because they would benefit most from the 
results of a KVA analysis.  It is possible to conduct 
research into the assignment of maintenance personnel by 
conducting a KVA analysis based on the approximations made 
in a mature Manpower Estimation Report (MER).  
Unfortunately, the P-8 MER will likely continue to undergo 
several significant revisions.  Given the heavy reliance  
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that the KVA approach has on manpower structure, any changes 
to the MER will make the analysis of little use to the P-8 
manpower decision-makers. 
The next best option is to choose an existing community 
that closely mirrors the mission and airframe of the P-8.  
Once the model is complete, it can be applied to the P-8 
after the MER is solidified.  The advantage of this approach 
is that it allows for the use of mature manning documents 
and historical maintenance data in the analysis, which will 
provide better results than an analysis driven by 
estimations.  Unfortunately, no existing community exactly 
mirrors that of the P-8 in terms of airframe and projected 
operational environment.  A good analogue is the E-6 Mercury 
— a jet aircraft manufactured by the Boeing Company that 
primarily conducts missions over water and routinely deploys 
away from its main operating base. 
1. Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) 
a. Mission 
The STRATCOMMWINGONE website describes TACAMO as: 
A Navy Air Wing fully integrated on an Air Force 
base, carrying out a Navy mission in joint 
operations.  Commander, Strategic Communications 
Wing One provides operational control and 
administrative support for Fleet Air 
Reconnaissance Squadrons Three, Four, Seven and 
various training units.  The Navy's TACAMO 
community provides a survivable communications 
link between the national decision makers and the 
country's arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons.  
In other words, our 16 E-6B Mercury aircraft 
enable the President of the United States and the 
Secretary of Defense to directly contact  
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submarines, bombers and missile silos protecting 
our national security through nuclear deterrence. 
(Commander, 2009)4 
b. History 
"Take Charge and Move Out!”  In July 1963, Rear 
Adm. Bernard F. Roeder, Director of Naval 
Communications for the Chief of Naval Operations, 
used these words to task the development of a 
unique part of naval aviation.  The nation needed 
a reliable strategic communications system 
between the President and other national command 
authorities with nuclear ballistic missile 
submarines.  This system had to survive any 
hostile military action.  The Navy created such a 
system, modifying a Marine Corps KC-130 Hercules 
transport aircraft with a Very Low Frequency 
radio transmitter capable of communicating with 
submerged missile submarines.  This experiment 
was a success and TACAMO, with its "Take Charge 
and Move Out" mission, was born.  Since then the 
three squadrons have flown over 28 years and 
400,000 hours of safe missions.  
The period following the end of the Cold War in 
1989 brought revolutionary changes to the world 
and to TACAMO as well.  The E-6A Mercury aircraft 
replaced the EC-130 Hercules that had provided 30 
years of faithful service.  TACAMO commands moved 
from six different homeports to a central 
location: Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.  The 
result is a 25 percent reduction in operations 
and personnel expenses. 
In years past, TACAMO provided communications 
capability only to submarines with ballistic 
missiles.  Currently, TACAMO provides command and 
control capability for all three strategic 
platforms including submarines, bombers and land-
based missile sites. 
                     
4 Commander, Strategic Communications Wing. TACAMO Community Mission, 
ONLINE. CSCW-1. Available: http://www.tacamo.navy.mil/. [8 March 2009].  
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On Oct. 1, 1998, The U.S. Navy's fleet of E-6Bs 
replaced the EC-135 in performing the "Looking 
Glass" mission flown for over 29 years by the 
U.S. Air Force.  This new mission allows the 
President and the Secretary of Defense direct 
command and control capability with America's 
strategic forces of ballistic nuclear missile 
submarines, intercontinental nuclear missiles, 
and strategic bombers.  With the assumption of 
this new mission, a battle staff now flies with 
the TACAMO crew. (Commander, 2009) 
 c. E-6 Mercury Capabilities 
The E-6 Mercury was built on a modified Boeing 
707-320 airframe that utilizes four high-bypass turbo fan 
jet engines.  Some specific characteristics of the aircraft 
are (Commander, 2009: 
 
Speed:   .88 mach 
Max range:   6,600 nm 
Endurance:   16.2 hours 
 w/refueling:  72 hours 
Ceiling:    42,000 feet 
Length:    150 feet 
Wing span:   148 feet 
Height:    42 feet 




Figure 2.   E-6B Mercury 
(From Radeki, 2007) 
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. Getting Started 
The TACAMO squadron manpower document (SQMD) provides a 
clean division of maintenance billets into functional areas 
called work centers (W/C).  Each W/C is tasked with the 
performance of a unique set of maintenance actions on the 
aircraft and can be used as the maintenance sub-processes 
that are required in a KVA analysis. 
Work performed on the aircraft by each W/C is captured 
on Maintenance Action Forms (MAF) and recorded in the Naval 
Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System 
(NALCOMIS); an information management system that acts as a 
repository for maintenance data.  Analyzing the data 
contained in NALCOMIS is critical in order to further 
understand the business processes used for maintenance on 
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the E-6 Mercury.  One year of maintenance data (January 
2008-December 2008) was obtained from both operational 
TACAMO squadrons (see Table 1).  Since the difference in 
total maintenance hours and number of MAFs provided no 
insight into which data was more valid, one squadron was 
chosen at random for analysis.  VQ-3 was selected to 
participate. 
 
 VQ-3 VQ-4 
Total Maintenance hours 159,469 133,265 
Total MAFs 13,915 20,833 
Table 1.   NALCOMIS Query Results 
 
A careful review of the MAF data revealed a discrepancy 
between the W/Cs identified in NALCOMIS and the SQMD.  
Specifically, NALCOMIS documented MAFs written against W/C 
121: Reels, 340: Detachment Site A, 341: Detachment Site B, 
X20 and X30.  These W/Cs do not exist in the SQMD.  
Likewise, there are some W/Cs identified in the SQMD (030: 
Maintenance Admin, 040: Quality Assurance, 050: Material 
Control and 05D: Tool Room) that are not recorded in 
NALCOMIS because these W/Cs did not complete any MAFs during 
the time period being studied. 
This discrepancy exists because there is a difference 
between ideal and real manning distribution in the squadron.  
The ideal manning distribution would be in accordance with 
the programmed requirements as defined in the SQMD.  
Realistically, Commanding Officers are responsible for 
 27
overall position management within their squadron and 
execute their prerogative, as authorized by COMNAVAIRFORINST 
4790.2a, to distribute personnel within their command in a 
manner that “optimizes economy, productivity and 
organizational effectiveness" (COMNAVAIRFORINST, 3-63).  
With regards to the KVA analysis, this results in an 
inability to effectively reconcile W/C NEC inventory against 
manpower NEC requirements.  This presents a significant 
problem because NEC learning times are a major contributor 
to the ALT calculation and will have a significant impact on 
the resulting ROK.  This is not the case with an ideal 
manning distribution because the SQMD clearly identifies the 
NEC requirements for each W/C.  Therefore, the KVA analysis 
must be based on the ideal manning distribution as defined 
in the SQMD.  Subsequently, sub-processes definition should 
also follow the structure provided in the SQMD. 
The drawback to using an ideal manning distribution is 
that it does not exactly mirror reality and requires some 
normalization of the NALCOMIS data in order to make it 
useable in the KVA analysis.  Specifically: 
• W/C 121 completed 928 MAFs and 7,765 maintenance 
man-hours.  Since this W/C does not exist in the 
SQMD, these MAFs were assigned to W/C 120.  The 
justification is that W/C 120 and 121 perform 
similar maintenance actions and are manned with 
personnel with similar rates, ranks, and NEC 
requirements.  
• W/Cs 340 and 341 combined to complete 621 MAFs and 
2,716 maintenance man-hours.  These W/Cs act as 
miniature maintenance departments located at 
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forward operating bases.  Since these W/Cs do not 
exist in the SQMD, these MAFs were individually 
assigned to other W/Cs that perform similar 
maintenance actions and are manned with personnel 
with similar rates, ranks and NEC requirements. 
The next, and much easier, step was to choose the most 
realistic unit of time that can be used as a standard for 
data collection across all sub-processes.  Since all 
NALCOMIS data and NEC learning times were recorded in units 
of hours, this was an appropriate unit. 
Two independent analyses were conducted.  The first 
analysis is referred to as the as-is model and calculated 
the ROK and %U for a manpower structure based on a 
deployable Navy standard workweek.  The second analysis, 
referred to as the to-be model, conducted the same 
calculations except the manpower structure was based on a 
non-deployable Navy standard workweek.  
2. Learning Audits 
Sufficient data is available for all three types of 
audits.  Figure 3 provides a visual representation of each 
learning audit.  The correlation between ALT and NLT is 
81.7% and is considered valid for this analysis.  ALT was 











Figure 3.   Learning Time Comparison 
 
a. W/C Actual Learning Time (ALT) 
W/C ALT is derived by adding the total formal 
classroom time associated with meeting NEC requirements and 
the average time to complete the W/C hands-on apprentice, 
journeyman and master programs.  Both the formal training 
and the hands-on program require independent calculations. 
The W/C formal training time calculation is 
relatively simple and unbiased.  The SQMD identifies primary 
and secondary NEC requirements for each individual billet.  
The Catalogue of Navy Training Courses (CANTARC) identifies 
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the classroom time required to complete the formal training 
necessary to obtain a particular NEC.  The W/C formal 
training time is calculated by adding the classroom time 
required for all primary and secondary NECs for all billets 
assigned to the W/C. 
The W/C hands-on program calculation is more 
complex and somewhat biased.  TACAMO has adopted the 
Qualified and Proficient Technician (QPT) program as its 
hands-on program. 
The QPT Program is in-service training for 
aviation units designed to encompass and 
standardize technical training and quantify 
maintenance proficiency levels across all 
aviation platforms.  QPT enables unit leadership 
to compare (its) Total Force Readiness to its 
Mission Readiness, calculate the effectiveness 
and efficiency of training, and prioritize 
training funding requirements by providing 
measurable standards of proficiency.(Commander 
Naval Air Forces, 2008, 10-1) 
The QPT program has three levels of certification: 
Qualified and Proficient Apprentice (QPA), Qualified and 
Proficient Journeyman (QPJ) and Qualified and Proficient 
Master (QPM). A maintenance technician’s level of 
certification is associated with a pay grade and expected 
level of proficiency.  The general doctrinal guidance is: 
QPA for E-4 and below, QPJ for E-5 and E-6, QPM for E-7 and 
E-8. 
Since the W/C ALT is defined in units of hours, 
and the QPT program does not explicitly identify learning-
time requirements for each level of certification, a 
subjective approach was used to capture W/C hands-on 
learning time.  Based on the best estimates from the  
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Aircraft Maintenance Officer, the approximate relationship 
between level of certification and hours spent learning is 
(VQ-3, 2009 : 
• QPM ~ 800-1000 learning hours 
• QPJ ~ 700-800 learning hours 
• QPA ~ 400-500 learning hours 
For use in the KVA analysis, the average estimated 
learning time was used for each QPT level of certification.  
The authors of this thesis acknowledge that this subjective 
estimate adds a degree of inaccuracy into the KVA analysis.  
However, it is the best available solution and will not 
affect the conclusions drawn from the KVA analysis because 
the inaccuracy remains constant in the as-is and to-be 
models. 
b. W/C Nominal Learning Time (NLT) 
For this application, NLT represents learning in 
use, not learning in inventory. Two independent calculations 
were used to capture W/C NLT.  The first method captured 
actual work performed by a W/C as a percentage of all work 
performed in the department.  Actual-work-performed data is 
derived from the MAFs recorded in NALCOMIS.  The second 
method captured the K-fires by a W/C as a percentage of all 
K-fires in the department.  K-fires data is derived from the 
MAFs recorded in NALCOMIS. 
c. W/C Ordinal Learning Time (OLT) 
OLT is a subjective ranking of the W/Cs based on 
learning complexity and disregards differences in pay grade.  
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This thesis relied on the experience and expertise of the 
Maintenance Master Chief and the Aviation Maintenance 
Officer.  They each offered independent rankings that had a 
correlation of 100%. 
3. W/C Number of Sailors 
The KVA analysis used the manpower billets assigned to 
each W/C as identified in the SQMD.  This was done primarily 
as a matter of consistency.  However, use of this data does 
assume that actual manning is at the same level as the SQMD.  
The authors acknowledge that this assumption adds a degree 
of inaccuracy into the KVA analysis for two reasons.  First, 
actual squadron manning levels are dependent on Navy Manning 
Plan fair-share distribution of manning inventory.  Second, 
actual manning distribution within the squadron is at the 
discretion of the Commanding Officer and is not necessarily 
in accordance with the SQMD.  This assumption is justified 
because any inaccuracy in W/C manning levels will have no 
effect on the conclusions drawn from the KVA analysis 
because the inaccuracy remains constant in the as-is and to-
be models. 
4. W/C Times fired (K-Fire) 
“Times fired” is the summation of all MAFs completed by 
a W/C during the period being studied.  In order to preserve 
the integrity of the KVA analysis, any W/C that completed 
less than 1% of all squadron MAFs (<139) were excluded from 
the model due to insufficient data.   
K-fire data on the remaining W/Cs was converted into 
times fired per hour.  This calculation used the “productive 
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workweek” (as defined in the OPNAVINST 1000.16K) for 
deployable and non-deployable aviation squadrons (60 hours 
for deployable squadrons and 33.38 hours for non-deployable) 
and a 48-week work-year (to account for standard four weeks 
annual leave). 
5. Percentage IT (%IT)  
For the purposes of this KVA analysis, the %IT was 
assumed to be 10% for all W/Cs.  A more accurate estimation 
could be determined by reviewing the Maintenance Requirement 
Cards for each MAF initiated over the period and by deriving 
an average for each W/C.  The time required to gather this 
information does not justify the minor increase in accuracy, 
particularly since the %IT is a minor additive.  This 
assumption is justified because any inaccuracy in %IT will 
have no effect on the conclusions drawn from the KVA 
analysis as long as the inaccuracy remains constant in the 
as-is and to-be models. 
6. W/C Total Learning Time (TLT) 
W/C TLT was calculated by using the formula for IT as a 
minor additive. 
( *% )TLT ALT ALT IT= +  
7. W/C Total Output 
This output was the product of TLT and K-Fire. 
8. W/C Actual Work Time (AWT) 
W/C AWT was derived from NALCOMIS data by combining the 
maintenance hours of work performed by all members of a W/C. 
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9. Cost per Sailor 
When determining manpower costs, NAVAIR 4.2 uses a flat 
rate, an annual standard of $94,000 per sailor (Tuemler, 
2007).  For use in the KVA, this value was converted to cost 
per hour using 48 weeks per year (to account for annual 
leave) and the Navy standard workweek (as defined in 
OPNAVINST 1000.16K) for deployable and non-deployable, land-
based aviation squadrons. This standard is a 60-hour 
workweek for deployable squadrons, 33.38-hour workweek for 
non-deployable units. 
10. W/C Total Input 
W/C total input was calculated using the product of W/C 
AWT, number of sailors, W/C K-fired per hour, and cost per 
sailor per hour. 
11. W/C Return on Knowledge (ROK) 
W/C ROK was calculated by dividing the W/C total output 
by the W/C total input.  A reduction factor of 1000 was then 
applied in order to create a scale that was usable for 
analysis. 
12. W/C Percent Utilization 
W/C percent utilization was calculated by dividing the 
W/C AWT by the number of hours available for productive 
work. 
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D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Assumptions 
• The learning times associated with QPT 
certification levels will not vary as a function 
of the Navy standard workweek. Thus, ALT remains 
constant for both the as-is and to-be models. 
• Actual manning is at the same level as defined in 
the SQMD for both the as-is and to-be models. 
• All available work time is dedicated only to 
aircraft maintenance. 
• The %IT is 10% for all W/Cs. 
• Annual cost of a sailor is constant ($94,000). 
• AWT is based on maintenance requirements of the 
aircraft and will not vary as a function of the 
Navy standard workweek. 
2. Limitations 
• The only non-subjective source of data available 
for input into the KVA is from NALCOMIS.  This 
data only captures direct maintenance man-hours 
within the department.  It does not capture the 
contribution made by management.   
E. RESULTS 
A summary and comparison of the KVA analysis results 
for both the as-is and to-be models is depicted in Table 2. 
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  Deployable Non-deployable Difference 

















110 Powerplants 21.64 40.3% 12.04 72.47% -9.60 32.15% 
120 Airframes 17.49 40.8% 9.73 73.40% -7.76 32.56% 
210 Avionics / IWT 28.26 53.1% 15.72 95.42% -12.54 42.33% 
220 Electricians 13.95 47.0% 7.76 84.44% -6.19 37.46% 
12C Corrosion Control 52.48 13.6% 29.20 24.49% -23.29 10.86% 
13B Paraloft 9.37 94.3% 5.21 169.45% -4.16 75.18% 
Table 2.   KVA Results Comparison 
 
F. ANALYSIS 
The KVA analysis had two weaknesses.  First, although 
the KVA analysis did an excellent job capturing the value of 
the actual work performed on VQ-3 aircraft, it failed to 
capture the value of management’s contribution to aircraft 
maintenance.  This is a known weakness of the KVA 
methodology and proved to be insignificant since the 
discrepancy was consistent between the as-is and to-be 
models.   
The second shortfall was that the analysis did not 
include all work centers. This flaw also proved to be 
insignificant because the results obtained from the 
remaining work centers had universal appeal.  Specifically, 
the KVA analysis revealed that all W/Cs analyzed experienced 
a reduction in ROK of approximately 44% between the as-is 
and to-be model.  This indicates that the as-is manpower 
structure is categorically more valuable to the maintenance 
department than that of the to-be.  
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The percent utilization calculation produced some 
interesting results.  Generally speaking, optimal W/C %U is 
between 60-80%.  A %U greater than 80% is acceptable; 
however, it will likely have a negative impact on quality of 
life if sustained over long periods of time.  Any %U greater 
than 100% indicates there are not enough manpower resources 
being applied to the W/C (Cook, 2008). 
With the exception of the Paraloft, the %U for W/Cs in 
the as-is model is relatively low.  This is the result of 
the assumption that all available work time is dedicated 
only to aircraft maintenance; yet, we know this is not true.  
For example, some W/C personnel are also aircrew and, as 
such, spend a portion of their work hours available flying 
the aircraft.  This will necessarily drive down the %U. 
One item of concern stemming from the analysis is the 
%U of W/C 13B (Paraloft).  In the as-is model, this W/C is 
operating near full capacity (94.3%).  As mentioned 
previously, this level of loading will have a negative 
impact on quality of life if sustained over long periods of 
time.  Even more alarming, the %U for W/C 13B in the to-be 
is 169.45%.  This is a clear indication that more manpower 
resources would be required if the non-deployable standard 
workweek were to be employed for this W/C.  A 214% increase 
in manpower would be required to reduce the to-be %U below 
80%.  In fact, the manpower requirements for any W/C in the 
to-be model must be increased 180% in order to maintain the 
same %U as that of the as-is.5 
 
                     
5 Calculated using a ratio of the deployable and non-deployable Navy 






Figure 4.   Work Center Percent Utilization Comparison 
for As-is (Deployable) and To-be Model (Non-
deployable) 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis used two different approaches to address 
the question: can cost savings be realized with an equitable 
billet distribution between deployable and non-deployable 
Navy standard workweeks?  The first analysis revealed that 
manpower costs are doctrinally bound to the Navy standard 
workweek, which is applied as a function of the ROC and POE.  
Using the doctrinal approach, the authors conclude that a 
cost savings cannot be realized without a corresponding 
change to the mission and operating environment of the 
aviation platform. 
The second analysis using the KVA methodology proved to 
be a good supplement to the doctrinal approach. It provided 
additional insight into the business processes within the 
maintenance department of an aviation squadron.  The KVA 
analysis demonstrated that: (1) the maintenance department 
benefited categorically from use of the deployable Navy 
standard workweek; (2) a significant increase in manpower 
resources would be required in order for any of the W/Cs to 
obtain a satisfactory level of utilization using a non-
deployable standard workweek. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Navy standard workweek assignments for any aviation 




and POE.  Since these are normally classified documents, 
specific recommendations concerning ROC/POE are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.   
 However, the KVA demonstrated that the deployable Navy 
standard workweek categorically resulted in a higher ROK; an 
average increase of 44%.  Thus, we recommend manpower 
planners use the deployable Navy standard workweek whenever 
possible. 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Management Value Added (MVA) is another value-based 
approach that attempts to capture the contributions made by 
management.  The KVA and MVA methodologies should be applied 
to the P-8 MER in order to gain clarity on the actual value 
of each work center.  This could prove useful to P-8 
manpower decision-makers as they determine which work 
centers should remain organic to the organization and which 
should become contractor logistic support. 
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